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Abstract. We analyze the security of the efficient two-party quantum private
comparison protocol with decoy photons and two-photon entanglement. It is shown
that the compromised third party (TP) can obtain the final comparison result without
introducing any detectable errors in the standard semi-honest model. The attack
strategy is discussed in detail and an improvement of this protocol is demonstrated.
The idea of our attack might be instructive for the cryptanalysis of quantum
cryptographic schemes.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta
2Protocols for private comparison allow two players holding secret nonnegative
integers x and y to compute whether their secret x and y are equal or not without
revealing to the other player any additional information about their respective
value, which is a variant of the millionaires’ problem (also called secure multi-party
computation), introduced by Yao [1, 2]. It has wide applications, such as private bidding
and auctions, secret ballot elections, commercial business and data mining. Because of
its importance and wide applicability, many protocols for private comparison have been
proposed in modern cryptography [3, 4, 5]. However, in quantum cryptography, Lo
[6] shows that the equality function cannot be securely computed between two players.
However, if some additional assumptions are made, the goal can be achieved.
With the help of a third party, Yang et al. proposed the first efficient protocol
for quantum private comparison (QPC) based on decoy photons and two-photon
entanglement in 2009 [7]. They proved that their protocol can ensure fairness, efficiency
and security in the standard semi-honest (also know as honest-but-curious) model
where players are assumed to follow the protocol but may then try to learn additional
information from the protocol execution. Here, we study the cryptanalysis of this
protocol and we will show that the compromised TP can learn the final comparison
result even if he follows the protocol honestly. And a simple solution to this problem is
proposed so that it can withstand this kind of attack. For simplicity we will call this
protocol YW protocol in the following text.
We first describe YW protocol briefly. Suppose there are a third party TP, and two
players Bob and Charlie. The secret inputs of Bob and Charlie are x and y, respectively.
And the protocol is executed in the standard semi-honest model. The YW protocol
consists of the following steps.
(1) The TP, Bob and Charlie agree that the four unitary operations U00 = I,
U01 = σz, U10 = σx and U11 = iσy represent two-bit information 00, 01,10 and 11,
respectively.
(2) The TP randomly prepares a sequence of n(n > M/2) ordered EPR pairs
T and the initial states of EPR pairs only known to him. The EPR pairs in the
sequence T can be formed two ordered photon sequences TB = {t
1
B, t
2
B, · · · , t
n
B} and
TC = {t
1
C , t
2
C , · · · , t
n
C}. Then the TP adopts the decoy photon technique for preventing
the dishonest player from eavesdropping, and sends the sequence TB to Bob and TC to
Charlie.
(3) After Bob and Charlie have received all the particles, the TP, Bob and Charlie
will check whether the particles are eavesdropped during the transmission by the decoy
photon technique. If the error rate is higher than the threshold, then the protocol will
be aborted. Otherwise, they proceed to step (4).
(4)Bob and Charlie encode their secrets’ hash values H(X) and H(Y ) on the
photons held by them with the four unitary operations, respectively. Here, X and
Y are the binary representations of x and y in F2N . To check whether the TP will cheat
in the following announcement of his measurement outcomes, Bob and Charlie perform
the following two actions [8].
3(i) They firstly require the TP to publish the initial states of the remaining intact EPR
pairs in the original order he initially prepared. The set of these sampling EPR
pairs will be used to detect whether the TP is cheating.
(ii) Then Bob (Charlie) inserts the sampling EPR photons into the encoded photon
sequence at the positions determined by the secret random value of l which is
generated by using the QKD method and is unknown to the TP. The above
operation corresponds to a secret permutation operation applied on the entire
photon sequence. We denote the new sequence T
′
.
For checking eavesdropping in quantum channels, Bob and Charlie send the sequence
T
′
back to the TP by using the decoy photon technique.
(5) After the TP has received all the particles, the TP, Bob and Charlie will
first check the eavesdropping during the transmission by the decoy photon technique.
If they confirm that there is no eavesdropping, then the TP measures each two
correlated photons received form Bob and Charlie with respect to the orthonormal basis
{|φ±〉, |ψ±〉} and publishes the measurement outcomes. Moreover, he still publishes the
initial states of EPR pairs in the original order he initially prepared. Then Bob and
Charlie check whether the TP is honest by comparing the measurement outcomes with
the TP’s beforehand announcements in step (4). If the inconsistency rate between
them is higher than the threshold, Bob and Charlie can find the TP is cheating and
abort the protocol. Otherwise, they can distill the outcomes of the combination of the
unitary operations performed by them from the TP’ measurement outcomes and their
initial states with error correction and privacy amplification and deduce the comparison
result.
The fairness, security and efficiency of the YW protocol have been proven in the
original paper. And the fairness means that one player knows the compared result if and
only if the other one knows the result; the security of the protocol for the two players
means that any information about their secret inputs will not leak including the final
comparison result; here, efficiency means the involvement of the TP will improve the
efficiency of the protocol compared with the case without the TP. When we analyze the
security of the YW protocol, we will also consider three possible cases as mentioned in
Ref. [7]: (1) the honest TP and a player (Charlie), and a dishonest one Bob. (2) a
compromised TP and two honest players Bob and Charlie. (3) the TP colludes with
a dishonest player, say Bob. In the standard semi-honest (also known as honest-but-
curious) model, parties are assumed to follow the protocol but may then try to learn
additional information from the protocol execution. The authors of Ref. [7, 8] believed
that ”the TP cannot learn any information about the players’ respective private inputs
and even about the comparison result in that the TP cannot discriminate between the
encoded EPR pairs and the sampling ones because Bob and Charlie insert the sampling
ones into the encoded EPR particle sequences at the positions determined by the random
number l only known to Bob and Charlie.” However, this conclusion will be broken in
the standard semi-honest model. As the compromised TP can learn some additional
4information from the protocol execution (to be precise, the TP can record the number
of each secret EPR pairs), and then follow the protocol honestly; after the end of the
protocol, the TP can deduce the comparison result by comparing the number of each of
the measurement outcomes (EPR pairs) with the initial recorded number of the EPR
pairs. In the following we will describe the TP’s eavesdropping in detail.
The TP will record some additional information in step (2) and (5) in YW’s protocol
[7]. In step (2), we assume the TP prepares a sequence of n ordered EPR pairs T each
randomly in one of the four Bell states only known to him. Additionally, the TP
records the number of each Bell states. Here, suppose there are n1 |φ
+〉, n2 |φ
−〉, n3
|ψ+〉 and n4 |ψ
−〉, where n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n. Then the TP will honestly execute the
protocol with Bob and Charlie. In step (5), the TP takes a Bell-basis measurement on
each two correlated photons received from Bob and Charlie, records these measurement
outcomes and publishes his initial states of EPR pairs. Additionally, the TP also records
the number of these measurement outcomes. Here, suppose there are n
′
1 |φ
+〉, n
′
2 |φ
−〉,
n
′
3 |ψ
+〉 and n
′
4 |ψ
−〉, where n
′
1 + n
′
2 + n
′
3 + n
′
4 = n. After obtaining the additional
information n1, n2, n3, n4, n
′
1, n
′
2, n
′
3, n
′
4, the TP can deduce the comparison result. If
there are ni and n
′
i, meet the ni 6= n
′
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, then the secret inputs of Bob and
Charlie are not equal. However, if all ni = n
′
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, then the TP will obtain
nothing. And the TP will not induce any error in both of the situations.
Now we demonstrate the TP’s eavesdropping by an example. Suppose that
Bob and Charlie have secret inputs H(X) = 00011011 and H(Y ) = 10110011,
respectively. The TP prepares a sequence of 8 ordered EPR pairs T =
{|φ+〉, |φ+〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉} in step (2). And there are n1 = 2 |φ
+〉,
n2 = 1 |φ
−〉, n3 = 3 |ψ
+〉 and n4 = 2 |ψ
−〉. Here, n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = 8. According
to the YW’s protocol, Bob and Charlie encode their secret inputs H(X) = 00011011
and H(Y ) = 10110011 on the EPR pairs with the four unitary operations, respectively.
After the TP taking a Bell-basis measurement on each two correlated photons received
form Bob and Charlie in step (5), he records the number of each Bell states, i.e., n
′
1 = 1
|φ+〉, n
′
2 = 1 |φ
−〉, n
′
3 = 4 |ψ
+〉 and n
′
4 = 2 |ψ
−〉. As n1 6= n
′
1 and n3 6= n
′
3, the TP
deduces that the secret inputs of Bob and Charlie are unequal.
The reason for our attack is available is that (1) the exact number of each EPR pairs
is known to the TP, and the sampling Bell states are not changed during the protocol;
(2) if the secret inputs of Bob and Charlie are equal, the encoded Bell states are also
unchanged after the unitary operations. So if the secret inputs of Bob and Charlie are
equal, all the initial Bell states are unchanged. Obviously, the number of each Bell state
has not changed. In other words, if there is a Bell state’s number has changed after the
measurement, the TP can be convinced that the secret inputs are unequal.
To find a way to improve the YW protocol, it is necessary to revisit the essential
reason why the YW protocol is susceptible to our attack. In our opinion, the following
fact is the main reason. The sampling EPR pairs for checking the TP’s cheating has not
changed during the protocol. Though the TP cannot discriminate between the encoded
EPR pairs, and those for checking cheating and his cheating attack is invalid in the
5second security check, he can deduce the comparison result by comparing the number of
each Bell states between the initial states and these after the measurement. Therefore,
if Bob and Charlie make unitary operations on the sampling EPR pairs according to
some secret value generated by the QKD protocol. Then the checking photons will be
changed and the number of each EPR pairs also will be changed. With this modification,
YW protocol will be secure against the above attack form the TP.
In conclusion, we present an sample and effective attack on YW protocol [7, 8], by
which the compromised third party (TP), learning some additional information from
the protocol execution, can obtain the comparison result in the standard semi-honest
model, and some discussions on how to improve the protocols are presented. Therefore,
more attention must be paid to the additional information which may be obtained
by eavesdropper in the design and analysis of such protocols. The less additional
information leaked, the more secure our protocol designed.
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